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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme Court has transferred this appeal to this Court
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4).

Accordingly, this Court has

jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a3(2)(k) -- "cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme
Court.M
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND THE STANDARD OF REVIEW
1.

Issue Presented for Review

Whether the District Court properly dismissed Nielsen's personal
injury action on the basis that Nielsen had previously brought suit
against the Mortensens for damages arising out of the same factual
incident?
2.

Standard of Review

This Court reviews a dismissal based on Rule 12(b)(6)
"accept[ing] the material allegations of the complaint as true, and
the trial court's ruling should be affirmed only if it clearly appears
the complainant can prove no set of facts in support of his or her
claims."

Wright v. University of Utah, 876 P.2d 380, 382 (Utah App.

1994) (citing Hansen v. Department of Fin. Inst., 858 P.2d 184, 185-86
(Utah App. 1993)).

"The propriety of a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal is a

question of law that [this Court] review[s] for correctness, giving no
particular deference to the lower court's determination."

Id. (citing

St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's Hosp.. 811 P.2d 194, 196
(Utah 1991); Hansen, 858 P.2d at 186). The fact that the trial court
considered matters outside the pleadings is of no consequence to the
instant appeal because, whether this court treats this as an appeal
from an order granting a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) or from
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a Rule 5 6 summary judgment motion, this court reviews the trial
court's decision for correctness.

Schurtz v. BMW of No. Am. Inc., 814

P.2d 1108 (Utah 1991).
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS
This appeal does not involve the interpretation of
Constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, or regulations
which would be determinative of the appeal.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1.

Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and
Disposition in the Courts Below.

Appellant Lynn Nielsen ("Nielsen") appeals the Third District
Court's Order granting Appellees Ronald and Del Rae Mortensen's
("Mortensens") Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), dismissing
Nielsen's personal injury action with prejudice.
On April 13, -1992, Nielsen filed a small claims action against
the Mortensens for property damage arising out of an alleged slip and
fall at the Mortensens' premises on April 10, 1991 (hereinafter
"Nielsen I").

(See copy of Small Claims Affidavit; Record, page 28).

On May 6, 1992, the Small Claims Court held a trial, heard arguments
from both parties, and entered a judgment in favor of the Mortensens.
(See Copy of Small Claims Judgment; Record, page 29).
On May 13, 1992, Nielsen appealed the small claims decision to
the Third Circuit Court, and the Circuit Court scheduled a trial de
novo for August 28, 1992.
30).

(See copy of Notice of Appeal; Record, page

The Circuit Court in Nielsen I held the trial de novo on August

28, but Nielsen failed to appear either personally or through counsel.
Rather, a friend of Nielsen's appeared on her behalf and requested a

2

continuance for Nielsen.

Because Nielsen failed to demonstrate due

diligence to appear either personally or through counsel, the Circuit
Court entered a judgment against Nielsen, dismissing Nielsen I with
prejudice.

(See copy of Judgment and Order; Record, pages 31-32).

Subsequently, on December 30, 1993, Nielsen, through counsel,
filed in the Third District Court an action for personal injury
damages arising out of the same slip and fall which occurred on
April 10, 1991, at the Mortensens' premises (hereinafter "Nielsen
I_I").

(See Complaint; Record, pages 2-5). In response, on January

21, 1994, Mortensens' filed a Motion to Dismiss Nielsen's complaint
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), asserting that the doctrine of res judicata
barred Nielsen's claim for personal injury damages.

(See Defendants'

Motion to Dismiss and supporting memoranda; Record, pages 19-32,
36-40) .
After an initial hearing, the Honorable John A. Rokich reserved his
ruling on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss until a second hearing could
be held on May 9, 1994, to determine when Nielsen first discovered
that she was injured.

(See Minute Entry; Record, page 46).

After hearing testimony from Nielsen and considering all of the
evidence presented at the second hearing, Judge Rokich concluded that
Nielsen knew she had been injured at the time she filed the Nielsen I
complaint.

The judge ruled that Nielsen II was barred by the doctrine

of res judicata.

Consequently, Judge Rokich granted Mortensens'

Motion to Dismiss, dismissing the Nielsen II complaint with prejudice.
(See Minute Entry; Record, page 73; and Order; Record, pages 74-75).
Nielsen filed a Notice of Appeal on June 20, 1994, (See Notice
of Appeal; Record, page 76), and the Supreme Court of Utah received
3

the Notice of Appeal on October 17, 1994.

Subsequently, the Supreme

Court transferred Nielsen's appeal to this Court.
2.

Statement of Facts

The instant appeal arises out of an alleged slip and fall which
Nielsen claims occurred on April 10, 1991 at the residence of the
Mortensens.
Nielsen claims that she, as a result of the fall, injured her
left wrist and hand, and additionally damaged some jewelry she was
wearing at the time.

(Small Claims Affidavit, Third district

Complaint; Record, pages 28 and 2-5).
On April 13, 1992 Nielsen filed the complaint in Nielsen I
against the Mortensens, sounding in tort, for property damages
resulting from the April 10, 1991 slip and fall.

After the Nielsen I

claims were dismissed with prejudice, on December 30, 1993, Nielsen,
through counsel, filed the complaint in Nielsen II against the
Mortensens, sounding also in tort, for personal injuries arising out
of the same April 10, 1991 slip and fall.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
This Court should affirm the District Court's order dismissing
the Nielsen II complaint because the claim preclusion branch of the of
the res judicata doctrine prohibits Nielsen from splitting her
personal injury claims from her property damage claims.

Nielsen I and

the subsequent Nielsen II meet the three requirements necessary to
conclude that Nielsen is prohibited from splitting the two actions:
(1)

Nielsen and the Mortensens were parties to both actions;

(2)

Nielsen could have originally asserted the personal injury and
property damage claims in the Third District Court, a court of general
4

jurisdiction, but chose not to; and (3)

the Circuit Court, having

competent jurisdiction in Nielsen I. entered a judgment by default
which resulted in a final judgment on the merits.
ARGUMENT
THIS COURT SHOULD AFFIRM THE DISMISSAL OF THE NIELSEN II
COMPLAINT BECAUSE CLAIM PRECLUSION PROHIBITS SPLITTING
CLAIMS WHICH ARISE OUT OF THE SAME INCIDENT.
It is axiomatic that the law disfavors the splitting of a cause
of action and generally requires parties to include all claims which
arise out of the same nucleus of operative facts.

Indeed, the above-

stated, along with similar policies provided the genesis of the' res
judicata doctrine.

In D'Aston v. D'Aston, 844 P.2d 345 (Utah App.

1992), the Court stated:
In order for a claim to be barred by res judicata,
both the prior claim and the current claim must meet
three requirements: (1) both actions must involve the
same parties, their privies, or assignees; (2) the
claim that is asserted to be barred must have been
presented or be such that it could have been presented
in the first case; and (3) the first suit must have
resulted in a final judgment on the merits by a court
of competent jurisdiction.
Id. at 350. (Emphasis added.)
Utah courts have consistently applied the res judicata doctrine to bar
lawsuits asserting claims which could have been presented in prior
related lawsuits.
In Belliston v. Texaco, Inc., 521 P.2d 379 (Utah 1974), a number
of lessee dealers sued the oil company to recover for unlawful price
discrimination in violation of Utah's Unfair Practices Act.

Texaco

moved for summary judgment on the basis that the same dealers had
previously brought an action in federal court alleging violations of
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federal law arising out of the same alleged misconduct.

The state law

claims were never asserted in the prior federal action, however,
Texaco claimed the dealers could have brought the state claims in the
prior federal action had they so desired, under the doctrine of
pendent jurisdiction.

The lower court agreed and granted Texaco's

motion for summary judgment.

In affirming the Utah Supreme Court

stated:
Since plaintiffs failed to assert their state claim,
when the federal court had the power to adjudicate it
with the federal claim, they are barred under the
doctrine of res judicata from litigating these issues
in the instant action.
Id. at 382.
The court reasoned that the doctrine of res judicata applies not only
to points and issues which are actually raised and decided in a prior
action, but also applies to those that could have been adjudicated, as
long as the claims all arise out of a common nucleus of operative
facts.

As before mentioned, Utah courts have consistently adhered to

this rule.

Bradshaw v. Kershaw, 627 P.2d 528 (Utah 1981), where a

defendant was barred by res judicata from asserting an affirmative
defense of impossibility of performance in a contract action when he
could have asserted the defense in a prior action; D1Aston v. D'Aston,
844 P.2d 345 (Utah App. 1992), where a prior divorce proceeding which
had adjudicated property disputes barred re-litigation of any of those
issues by any of the parties to the prior action; Rinawood v. Foreign
Auto Works, Inc., 786 P.2d 1350 (Utah App. 1990), where a prior
decision on a contract dispute regarding buyers and seller barred
seller's claim in a subsequent action on the same contract.

6

Nielsen I and Nielsen II satisfy the three requirements of the
claim preclusion branch of the res judicata doctrine.

First, there

can be no dispute that both Nielsen I and Nielsen II involve the
identical parties.

A more detailed discussion of the second and third

requirements is necessary.
A.

The Claims Asserted In Nielsen II Clearly Could Have Been Asserted

In Nielsen I.
The Mortensens have already cited in this brief the Utah cases
regarding this issue, however, other highly persuasive authority
exists dealing with factual circumstances almost identical to those
presented by the instant case and is helpful in deciding the instant
appeal.
The Restatement (Second) of Judgments §24(1), states:
When a valid and final judgment rendered in an action
extinguishes the plaintiff's claim pursuant to the
rules of merger or bar, the claim extinguished
includes all rights of the plaintiff to remedies
against the defendant with respect to all or any part
of
the
transaction
or
series
of
connected
transactions, out of which the action arose.
In Comment g, illustration 14 of section 24, it states in relevant
part :
. . . when the jurisdiction of the court is limited .
. . the rule stated in this section as to splitting a
claim is applicable although the first action was
brought in a court which has no "jurisdiction to give a
judgment for more than a designated amount. (Emphasis
added.)

14. In an automobile collision, A is injured and his
car damaged as a result of the negligence of B.
Instead of suing in a court of general jurisdiction of
the state, A brings his action for damage to his car
in a justice's court, which has jurisdiction in
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actions
for damages to property but has no
jurisdiction in actions for injuries to the person. A
judgment is rendered for A for damage to the car. A
cannot thereafter maintain an action against B to
recover for the iniurv to his person arising out of
the same collision. (Emphasis added.)
Although not citing these specific portions, this Court has
formally adopted §24 of the Restatement.

See Berrv v. Berry, 73 8 P.2d

246, 248 n. 1 (Utah App. 1987); Ringwood v. Foreign Auto Works, Inc.,
786 P.2d 1350, 1357, cert, denied 795 P.2d 1138 (Utah App. 1990).
Additionally, other jurisdictions dealing with situations almost
identical to that presented by the instant case, have relied upon the
res judicata doctrine and §24 in concluding that the subsequent
personal injury action was barred due to a final judgment rendered in
the previous property damage action.

In Kirchner v. Riherd, 702

S.W.2d 33 (Ky. 1985), an injured driver brought an action in a court
of general jurisdiction against the second driver for personal injury
damages suffered in an automobile accident.

Injured driver had

previously filed a small claims complaint for property damage and loss
of use of the automobile involved and obtained a judgment.

At the

trial level summary judgment was granted in favor of defendant driver,
the Court of Appeals reversed and the Supreme Court reviewed the case.
Affirming the trial court's grant of summary judgment, the
Supreme Court stated:
Where a plaintiff, who has a claim which in its
entirety
exceeds
in amount
the
court's
jurisdiction, brings an action and recovers
judgment for an amount within the court's
jurisdiction or is denied recovery by a judgment
on the merits, he is, by operation of the
judgment, precluded from thereafter maintaining
an action for the balance of his claim, even
though the court rendering the former judgment
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had no authority to give a judgment upon this
balance.
Id. at 34.
Similarly, in Mells v. Billoos, 482 A.2d 759 (Del. Super. Ct.,
1984), a motorcyclist brought an action in the justice of the peace
court for property damage sustained in an automobile accident and
obtained a judgment in his favor.

He then brought an action in

Superior Court for personal injuries arising out of the same accident.
Defendant's motion for summary judgment was granted and motorcyclist
appealed.

Affirming, the Superior Court stated:
Justices of the Peace have jurisdiction over
actions of trespass involving damages which do
not exceed $1,500.00. This limited jurisdiction
does not include claims involving personal
injuries.
Thus, there is no question that
plaintiff could not have presented his claim in
its entirety in the prior adjudication, due to
the limited jurisdiction of the justice of the
peace court.
The fact remains, however, that plaintiff was not
compelled to bring part of his claim in the
justice of the peace court.
Rather, he
voluntarily chose a court of limited jurisdiction
when he could have presented all his claims,
property damage and personal injury had he
brought the original action in this court.

Id. at 761.
The opinion also contains discussion and analysis of similar decisions
from other jurisdictions.
In Dill v. Averv, 502 A.2d 1051 (Md. 1986), husband and wife
brought an action against driver of other automobile for wife's
personal injuries and both of their losses of consortium.

Previously,

husband and wife had filed an action against defendant for automobile
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damage resulting from the same collision.
defendant's motion to dismiss.

The trial court granted

On appeal, the dismissal was affirmed.

In discussing this issue, the Maryland Court of Appeals
recognized the vast majority of jurisdictions following the
Restatement Rule:
In 24 A.L.R.4th 646 (1983), a second and equally
extensive annotation upon that issue cited cases
in a great many jurisdictions in the course of
which it is said in section 3 (a) that cases
generally support the broad proposition that a
single act which causes simultaneous injury to
the physical person and property of one
individual gives rise to only one cause of
action.
Id. at 1053.
Nielsen cannot persuasively argue to this Court that she
could not have brought her personal injury claims in Nielsen I
because of the limited jurisdictional amount of the small claims
court.

At all relevant times a court of general jurisdiction was

available to Nielsen, but she simply chose not to avail herself of
this opportunity.

Clearly, the above-cited authority shows that

Nielsen's claims in Nielsen II could have been and should have
been brought in Nielsen I and therefore satisfy the second
requirement of the claim preclusion branch of the res judicata
doctrine.
B.

Nielsen I Resulted In A Final Judgment For Purposes of Res

Judicata.
A judgment is final for purposes of the res judicata doctrine
if it, "puts an end to a lawsuit declaring that the plaintiff is
or is not entitled to recover the remedy sought."
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Schonev v.

Memorial Estates, Inc., 863 P.2d 59, 61 (Utah App. 1993).

In

Schonev, the Utah Court of Appeals concluded that a default
judgment entered in favor of defendants in a prior lawsuit barred
the filing of a subsequent lawsuit by the same plaintiff for
claims arising out of the same incident.
The instant case presents a judgment very similar to that
dealt with in Schonev.

In the instant case, Nielsen failed to

appear at the circuit court for the scheduled trial and her claims
were dismissed with prejudice.

Nielsen's attempts to explain to

this Court the reasons for which the default was improperly
entered against her are irrelevant to the instant appeal.
cannot raise issues for the first time on appeal.

A party

If Nielsen felt

that the default judgment was improperly entered against her, she
could have availed herself of post trial motions as provided by
the Rules of Civil Procedure, but chose not to.

Clearly, the

judgment entered against Nielsen in Nielsen I was a final judgment
for purposes of res judicata,
Nielsen is misplaced in her assertion that an order is not
final if, when appealed, it leads to a trial de novo.

The

authority upon which plaintiff relies is not applicable to the
instant case.

For example, Salt Lake Citv v. Piepenbura. 571 P.2d

1299 (Utah 1977), involves a prosecution and conviction for the
exhibition of an obscene motion picture.

The language which

plaintiff cites is found in Justice Maughan's dissenting opinion
and is pure dictum.

Plaintiff is equally misplaced in relying

upon the case of Kirk v. Div. of Occ. & Pro. Licensing, 815 P.2d
242 (Utah App. 1991), which involves an appeal of the order of an
11

administrative law judge and the application of the res judicata
doctrine in that setting.

Clearly, the instant appeal does not

present this Court with such a procedural background and the case
is inapplicable.
In short, Nielsen has not provided this Court with any
applicable or persuasive authority to support her position.

This

Court should conclude that the District Court properly dismissed
Nielsen's complaint in the instant case.
CONCLUSION
Assuming all of Nielsen's allegations in the instant case to be
true, on April 10, 1991, Nielsen slipped and fell at the Mortensens'
residence which resulted in damages to some jewelry which Nielsen was
wearing at the time, along with personal injuries.

Thereafter,

Nielsen filed the Nielsen I lawsuit against the Mortensens alleging
that the Mortensens were negligent and that such negligence caused
Nielsen to suffer property damage.

After an adverse final judgment

was rendered against Nielsen, she decided to file Nielsen II against
the Mortensens, alleged that the Mortensens were negligent and that
such negligence caused Nielsen to suffer personal injuries.

At all

relevant times, a court of general jurisdiction was available to
Nielsen, in which she could have filed a tort action against the
Mortensens and asserted all claims arising out of the April 10, 1991
slip and fall, but for some reason she chose not to.
Because the parties in both Nielsen I and Nielsen II are
identical, the Nielsen II claims could or should have been asserted
in Nielsen I, and Nielsen I resulted in a final judgment on the
merits, Judge Rokich correctly reasoned that the claim preclusion
12

branch of the res judicata doctrine barred Nielsen's claims in
Nielsen II and properly dismissed the complaint.
This Court should enter an Order affirming the District Court's
Order dismissing Nielsen's complaint against the Mortensen's with
prejudice.
DATED this

,
12>

day of April, 1995.
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